Guest and Telework resolve public DNS only, through a second Blocky instance
This design gives the Guest leg (VLAN 3100) and the Telework leg (VLAN 3200) the answers that
public DNS gives, for every name, fzymgc.house included. A second Blocky instance on the
resolver pair serves those two legs. It holds no internal configuration, so it cannot return an
internal answer. Sean agreed the design on 2026-09-25. It closes issue #2302. No implementation
plan exists yet.
1. What changes for a client
Section titled “1. What changes for a client”Today a Guest or Telework client gets NXDOMAIN for every name under fzymgc.house and both
reverse zones. That includes the public names id.fzymgc.house and
cluster-docs.docs.fzymgc.house. After this change, the same client gets the same answer that a
phone on a cellular network gets.
| Query from Guest or Telework | Today | After |
|---|---|---|
id.fzymgc.house |
NXDOMAIN | The public Cloudflare answer |
dns-health.fzymgc.house (internal only) |
NXDOMAIN | NOERROR with no records. The public zone has wildcard MX records for *.fzymgc.house, so every name under it exists publicly. |
example.com |
The public answer | The public answer |
PTR for a 192.168.0.0/16 address |
NXDOMAIN | NXDOMAIN, answered locally by the special-use table of Blocky |
Trusted legs, the tailnet and the keepalived health client see no change.
2. The decision this replaces
Section titled “2. The decision this replaces”The Accepted ADR docs/adr/2026-08-28-blocky-per-client-view-withholds-the-whole-apex.md gives
every untrusted client the default client group of Blocky. That group carries the
internal-namespace denylist. The implementation of this design writes a new ADR that supersedes
the old one for Guest and Telework, and sets the status of the old ADR to Superseded.
The old ADR rejected a per-leg allowlist, and that rejection still holds. In one Blocky instance,
only blocking.clientGroupsBlock is per-client. The customDNS and conditional blocks are
global. An allowlisted name therefore continues down the chain to conditional.mapping, and
PowerDNS returns the internal address. Fence rule 57 (Guest) and fence rule 49 (Telework) block
that address. The client gets a correct-looking answer and a connection that times out.
This design does not allowlist names. It takes the internal answer source out of the path for the untrusted legs.
3. Design
Section titled “3. Design”3.1 Two Blocky instances on each resolver node
Section titled “3.1 Two Blocky instances on each resolver node”Each node of the pair (sandiego, portland) runs two Blocky processes from the one binary.
Main instance (blocky) |
Public instance (blocky-public) |
|
|---|---|---|
| Serves | Trusted legs, the tailnet, the health client | Guest and Telework |
| Listeners | dns_vlan_interfaces | selectattr('trusted'): address, VIP, address6, VIP6 |
dns_vlan_interfaces | rejectattr('trusted'): address, VIP, address6, VIP6 |
| Health listener | 127.0.0.1:53 |
127.0.0.3:53 |
conditional to PowerDNS |
Yes | No |
customDNS |
Yes | No |
blocking |
internal-namespace denylist, per-client groups |
No blocking section |
| Upstream | Control D over DoT | The same Control D endpoint over DoT |
| HTTP (metrics) | 127.0.0.1:4000 |
127.0.0.1:4001 |
The trusted attribute on each dns_vlan_interfaces entry stays the only place that declares
trust. It now also selects which instance listens on a leg. Every entry must declare the key. An
entry without it fails the render, so nothing converges until the leg is classified.
Both instances bind port 53 on different addresses, with ports.freeBind: true. No address
appears in both listener lists. The public instance also uses a loopback address of its own, so
the health check for each instance reaches that instance only. 127.0.0.2:53 is the
dnscrypt-proxy fallback stub on these nodes, so the public instance uses 127.0.0.3. The address
and the check name are declared once in group_vars/dns_hosts.yml for both roles.
The public instance turns on Blocky’s rebinding protection. Blocky drops any upstream answer that carries a private, ULA, loopback or link-local address. An internal address cannot reach these legs, even if the public zone or the Control D profile points inward.
3.2 The public instance has its own template
Section titled “3.2 The public instance has its own template”The public instance uses a new, short template, blocky-public-config.yml.j2. It does not add
conditionals to the 300-line main template. A reader can make sure that the file has no
conditional, customDNS or blocking key by reading it. A second unit file,
blocky-public.service, runs the same binary with the new configuration file. It carries the same
hardening and the same absence of ExecReload= as blocky.service.
The public instance keeps these parts of the main configuration:
- The DoT upstream pair, with the same
tcp-tls:form and the same TLS name pin. - The
rateLimitblock, with the same per-address caps. Its allowlist holds127.0.0.1, the source address of every query from the node, including the health check. - The
cachingblock. A public answer is safe to cache, because every client of this instance gets the same view. - The special-use domain handling, which is on by default. It answers every name under
invalid.NXDOMAIN locally, with no upstream query, and section 3.4 depends on that. The public instance has nocustomDNS, sowhoami.dns.invalidgets NXDOMAIN here, not an address.
3.3 Queries that the Firewalla catches
Section titled “3.3 Queries that the Firewalla catches”The Firewalla rule FW_PREROUTING_DNS_DEFAULT sends every routed udp/53 query from Guest and
Telework to the Firewalla itself. A client that uses the leg VIP it got from DHCP or RDNSS does
not meet this rule, because the VIP is on-link. A client with a hand-set resolver meets it. The
Firewalla dnsmasq for each of these legs reads its own resolv file, not the WAN file that the
trusted legs share.
Those files are ~/.router/config/dnsmasq/bond0.3100.resolv.conf and bond0.3200.resolv.conf.
A read on 2026-09-25 found nameserver 192.168.79.5 and nameserver 192.168.217.5, the leg VIPs.
So a caught query reaches the public instance, and the client still gets public DNS.
3.4 Keepalived
Section titled “3.4 Keepalived”VI_guest and VI_telework are not members of the dns_vips sync group. The group takes the
trusted legs only, so that an unauthenticated VRRP advert from an untrusted segment cannot move the
trusted VIPs. This design keeps that. Before this change the two instances had no tracker.
Each of the two instances gets its own track_script { chk_public_answer }. Sean ruled this on
2026-09-25. A failure of the public instance on the VIP holder moves only those two VIPs to the peer.
The trusted VIPs and dns_vips do not change.
The check asks the public instance at 127.0.0.3 for health.dns.invalid and requires NXDOMAIN.
Blocky answers that name from its special-use table, with no upstream query. The check fails only
when the public instance does not run or does not answer. An outage of the internet link, Control D
or PowerDNS does not fail it. A check that resolves a public name fails on both nodes during such
an outage, and then neither node holds the two VIPs.
3.5 What stays the same
Section titled “3.5 What stays the same”- The main instance keeps its
internal-namespacedenylist and its deny-by-absence default. After this change, no untrusted leg reaches the main instance through a listener. The denylist stays as the fall-through for a source that the configuration does not name. - The node nftables rules already accept
53on the Guest and Telework interfaces. They do not change. - The tailnet exemption, the Firewalla forwarding exemption and the rate-limit rules of the main instance do not change.
4. Acceptance
Section titled “4. Acceptance”Each reading must come from a host on that leg. A reading from any other host is routed, meets the
Firewalla DNAT, and measures the Firewalla. The Firewalla also intercepts plaintext queries to
public resolvers, so the public reference is DNS over HTTPS (DoH). The decoy is an address outside
the DHCP pool (.20 to .249). If it answers, the other readings did not measure the pair.
Guest, IPv4, from a host with an address in 192.168.79.0/24:
dig @192.168.79.5 id.fzymgc.house A +short | sortcurl -s -H 'accept: application/dns-json' \ 'https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query?name=id.fzymgc.house&type=A' # want: the same addressesdig @192.168.79.5 dns-health.fzymgc.house A +short # want: no output, never a 192.168. addressdig @192.168.79.250 id.fzymgc.house +time=2 +tries=1 # decoy: want a timeoutRepeat the block for AAAA, for the Guest IPv6 VIP fddb:f665:73f7:2::5, and for Telework at
192.168.217.5 and fddb:f665:73f7:5::5.
On each resolver node:
sudo ss -ulnp | rg ':53 ' # want: each untrusted address owned by the blocky-public PIDdig @127.0.0.3 health.dns.invalid +noall +comments | rg 'status: NXDOMAIN' # want: one matchdig @127.0.0.1 dns-health.fzymgc.house +short # want: the internal answer (main is unchanged)5. Work items
Section titled “5. Work items”- Split
blocky_listen_addressesinto the trusted and untrusted derivations inansible/roles/blocky/defaults/main.yml. - Add
blocky-public-config.yml.j2,blocky-public.serviceand the tasks that render, enable and restart them. Restart one node at a time. - Add
chk_public_answerand its script toansible/roles/keepalived/, and add the tracker toVI_guestandVI_telework. - Ship the
blocky-publicjournal through the DNS collector. - Write the new ADR, set the 2026-08-28 ADR to Superseded, and add the row to the ADR index.
- Update
docs/operations/dns.md: the resolver table rows for Guest and Telework, the client view section, and the Blocky listener check. - Take the readings in section 4 and record them in the pull request.