Cloudflare Operations
Terraform in tf/cloudflare/ owns every Cloudflare DNS record, zone setting, tunnel, Access
application, service token, R2 bucket, notification policy and Worker that this estate uses. The
HCP Terraform workspace main-cluster-cloudflare plans on every pull request that touches the
directory and applies on merge. This page states what exists, where each part is defined, and the
procedures that touch it. tf/cloudflare/CLAUDE.md carries the file layout and the import rules.
Quick Reference
Section titled “Quick Reference”| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Zones | Twelve account zones. Eleven carry a dns-<zone>.tf file. fovea-review.ai carries zone settings only |
| Terraform module | tf/cloudflare/ |
| Workspace | main-cluster-cloudflare |
| Provider credential | secret/fzymgc-house/infrastructure/cloudflare/bootstrap-token |
| Tunnel | fzymgc-house-main |
| Worker | hcp-terraform-discord |
| Public asset host | i.hl-assets.dev, an R2 custom domain with no tunnel, no Worker and no origin |
API Token Pattern
Section titled “API Token Pattern”Terraform authenticates as one hand-made bootstrap token. terraform.tf reads it from Vault as an
ephemeral value, so it never enters state or plan output. Account-owned workload tokens are made
by Terraform with cloudflare_account_token: the Email Sending tokens in nas_email.tf and
nodes_email.tf, the bucket-scoped R2 token in r2.tf, and the read-only token-expiry monitor
in token_expiry_monitor.tf. The bootstrap token cannot make itself, so it stays manual.
The bootstrap token is scoped to every zone in the account. Any zone added to the account is covered without a token edit. Because Terraform is the source of truth for every zone, the token can edit DNS on every domain in the account. It lives only in Vault.
The token’s grants are authoritative only in Cloudflare. Read them from the API, never from a comment or this page:
CF_TOKEN=$(vault kv get -field=token secret/fzymgc-house/infrastructure/cloudflare/bootstrap-token)curl -sS -H "Authorization: Bearer $CF_TOKEN" \ "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/<account_id>/tokens" \ | jq '.result[] | select(.name | test("bootstrap")) | {expires_on, policies}'The grants that this repository depends on, and why each one is load-bearing:
| Grant | Needed by |
|---|---|
| DNS Edit, Zone Read, Zone Settings Edit, on all zones in the account | dns-<zone>.tf, the data.cloudflare_zone lookups, zone-settings.tf |
| Cloudflare Tunnel Edit | tunnel.tf |
| Access: Apps and Policies Edit, Access: Identity Providers Edit, Access: Service Tokens Write | access.tf |
| Workers Scripts Edit | workers.tf |
| Account API Tokens Edit | every cloudflare_account_token resource |
| Email Sending Edit | nas_email.tf, nodes_email.tf |
| Workers R2 Storage Write and Read | r2.tf |
| Cache Settings Write, Zone Transform Rules Write | rulesets-hl_assets_dev.tf |
| Notifications Write | access.tf and notifications-hl_assets.tf |
| Cache Purge | the takedown procedure. No Terraform resource uses it, and it must stay |
Cloudflare lets a token grant only permission groups that it holds itself. Before an apply that mints a workload token with a new group, add that group to the bootstrap token in the dashboard. A missing grant fails at apply with a 403, and a failed apply blocks the whole shared workspace for every zone until a change merges.
Two groups are absent by decision, not by oversight. Without Managed headers Write, Cloudflare
Managed Transforms cannot be read or declared on any zone. Without Bot Management Write, the
managed robots.txt module cannot be turned off. The
edge-policy ADR records why.
Editing a token’s grants in place does not change its value, so a grant edit needs no Vault
write. An expiry does. The token carries an expiry date, and a lapse breaks every apply in the
workspace. token_expiry_monitor.tf mints a read-only credential at
secret/fzymgc-house/cluster/hl-assets/token-expiry-monitor, and the scheduled workflow
.github/workflows/hl-assets-operational-items.yml reads the expiry with it and fails when fewer
than TOKEN_WARNING_DAYS (90) remain. To renew, mint a new token with the same grants and write
it to Vault. The provider reads the latest version, so no configuration changes.
Vault Paths
Section titled “Vault Paths”| Path | Content |
|---|---|
secret/fzymgc-house/infrastructure/cloudflare/bootstrap-token |
The bootstrap token, key token |
secret/fzymgc-house/infrastructure/cloudflare/discord-webhook |
Discord webhook URL for the Worker |
secret/fzymgc-house/infrastructure/cloudflare/hcp-terraform-hmac |
HMAC secret the Worker validates |
secret/fzymgc-house/cluster/cloudflared/tunnels/fzymgc-house-main |
The tunnel token, written by tunnel.tf |
secret/fzymgc-house/cluster/cloudflare-access/oidc |
The Keycloak OIDC client that Access uses |
secret/fzymgc-house/cluster/hl-assets/access-token |
The three uploader service tokens, six fields |
secret/fzymgc-house/cluster/hl-assets/monitor-token |
The uptime monitor’s service token |
secret/fzymgc-house/cluster/hl-assets/r2 |
The bucket-scoped R2 token and endpoints |
secret/fzymgc-house/cluster/hl-assets/token-expiry-monitor |
The read-only token-metadata credential |
secret/fzymgc-house/infrastructure/nas/cloudflare-email |
The NAS Email Sending token |
secret/fzymgc-house/infrastructure/nodes/cloudflare-email |
The cluster nodes’ Email Sending token |
DNS Management
Section titled “DNS Management”Terraform is the source of truth for every Cloudflare DNS record and per-zone setting.
| File | Contents |
|---|---|
tunnel.tf |
Tunnel CNAMEs from the for_each maps in variables.tf: <name>-wh.fzymgc.net, id.fzymgc.house, <name>.fzymgc.net |
dns-<zone>.tf |
Every other record, one file per zone, one cloudflare_dns_record resource per record |
zone-settings.tf |
A cloudflare_zone_setting for each setting that differs from the Cloudflare default |
A zone is a data.cloudflare_zone lookup by name, not a managed resource. Terraform owns the
records and settings, not zone registration. hl-assets.dev is the exception: r2.tf writes its
zone id as a literal, because a zone id fed from a data source produces spurious replacement plans
for the R2 custom domain. Do not change it back.
Records NOT managed by Terraform (by design)
Section titled “Records NOT managed by Terraform (by design)”A controller owns these. Importing one gives the record two owners:
| Pattern | Owner |
|---|---|
_acme-challenge.* TXT |
cert-manager DNS-01 (argocd/app-configs/cert-manager-config/cloudflare-acme-issuer.yaml) |
cf<year>-<n>._domainkey TXT |
Cloudflare Email Routing DKIM |
The proxied CNAME for an R2 custom domain, today i.hl-assets.dev |
The R2 API, through cloudflare_r2_custom_domain in r2.tf |
minify and development_mode zone settings |
Nobody. Deprecated and transient |
Add DNS Record
Section titled “Add DNS Record”- For a service behind the tunnel, add an entry to
webhook_services,internal_servicesorssh_servicesinvariables.tf. The map key is the hostname label and the record name. - For any other record, add a
cloudflare_dns_recordto the matchingdns-<zone>.tf. Do not add animport{}block. That block is only for adopting a record that already exists. - Open a pull request. Make sure that the HCP plan shows the intended add and nothing else, then merge.
Adopting an existing (dashboard-created) record
Section titled “Adopting an existing (dashboard-created) record”cf-terraforming generates the HCL and the import{} block. Point it at a throwaway provider
schema directory so that init needs no HCP credentials:
export CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN=$(vault kv get -mount=secret -field=token \ fzymgc-house/infrastructure/cloudflare/bootstrap-token)cf-terraforming generate --zone <zone_id> --resource-type cloudflare_dns_record \ --terraform-install-path <schema_dir> --modern-import-blockMake sure that the plan is a pure import before you merge. It must read
N to import, 0 to add, 0 to change, 0 to destroy. The HCP speculative plan on the pull request
is the gate.
Do not adopt the R2 custom domain’s CNAME, even though cf-terraforming offers it. Do not create
or edit an R2 custom domain in the dashboard: the pinned provider cannot import
cloudflare_r2_custom_domain, so a dashboard-made one is drift with no remedy.
Add a New Zone / Domain
Section titled “Add a New Zone / Domain”-
The token needs no change. Its scope covers every zone in the account.
-
Create
dns-<zone-slug>.tf, with.and-written as_. For a zone full of dashboard records, adopt them as above. For an empty zone, write the resources directly. -
Add each setting that differs from the Cloudflare default to
zone-settings.tf. The API marks a changed setting withmodified_onset:Terminal window curl -sS -H "Authorization: Bearer $CF_TOKEN" \"https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/zones/<zone_id>/settings" \| jq '.result[] | select(.modified_on != null) | {id, value}' -
Open a pull request. Make sure that the HCP plan is a pure import or the intended adds, then merge.
Common Record Types
Section titled “Common Record Types”| Type | Use Case |
|---|---|
| A / AAAA | Direct IP mapping |
| CNAME | Alias / tunnel target (<id>.cfargotunnel.com) |
| MX / TXT | Mail routing, SPF / DKIM / DMARC |
| CAA | Certificate authority authorization |
Cloudflare Tunnel
Section titled “Cloudflare Tunnel”The tunnel gives external access to cluster services without a public address.
Internet -> Cloudflare -> Tunnel -> Traefik or Service -> PodManaged Services
Section titled “Managed Services”tunnel.tf declares the tunnel fzymgc-house-main, its ingress configuration and the matching
CNAMEs. The configuration source is Cloudflare, so the cloudflared connector in
argocd/app-configs/cloudflared-main/ carries no ingress rules of its own. Each map in
variables.tf produces one ingress rule and one CNAME per key:
| Variable | Hostname pattern | Protection |
|---|---|---|
webhook_services |
<name>-wh.fzymgc.net |
Public. Each origin validates its own webhook signature. An optional path regex limits the paths the tunnel forwards |
internal_services |
<name>.fzymgc.net |
Cloudflare Access |
ssh_services |
<name>.fzymgc.net |
Access browser-rendered SSH. The map is empty |
id.fzymgc.house is a fixed ingress rule to the Keycloak Service. The tunnel token is written to
Vault by tunnel.tf and read by the connector.
Two tunnel objects exist in the account that Terraform does not manage. Their records are
managed: wh-argowf.fzymgc.house and wh-events.fzymgc.house in dns-fzymgc_house.tf point at
one, and a record in dns-holomush_dev.tf points at the other. To adopt one, generate it with
cf-terraforming --resource-type cloudflare_zero_trust_tunnel_cloudflared.
To add a service to the tunnel, add a map entry. To add a service that needs Access, land the Access application in the same commit: a CNAME without the application is a public endpoint.
Add a New Tunnel
Section titled “Add a New Tunnel”A new tunnel is only for a separate connector or an isolation boundary.
- Add a
cloudflare_zero_trust_tunnel_cloudflared, acloudflare_zero_trust_tunnel_cloudflared_configand adata.cloudflare_zero_trust_tunnel_cloudflared_tokenintunnel.tf. - Write the token to Vault with a
vault_kv_secret_v2, in the shape oftunnel_credentials. - Point the CNAMEs at
<new-tunnel-id>.cfargotunnel.com. - Deploy a connector under
argocd/app-configs/cloudflared-<name>/that reads the token.
For a break-glass apply while HCP Terraform is unavailable, follow tf/cloudflare/MANUAL_APPLY.md.
Cloudflare Access
Section titled “Cloudflare Access”access.tf declares the identity providers, the policies and the applications. Three identity
providers exist: Keycloak (OIDC, client from Vault), Email One-Time PIN, and GitHub, which exists
only when the workspace variable github_oauth_client_id is set.
| Application | Hostname | Session | Policies |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cluster Documentation | cluster-docs.docs.fzymgc.house |
24h | docs_allow: four email domains |
| Uptime Kuma Status Page | status.fzymgc.net |
24h | docs_allow |
| Keycloak Admin Console | id.fzymgc.house/admin and /realms/master |
4h | docs_allow. Keycloak is not an allowed provider here, because gating Keycloak’s admin console with Keycloak is circular |
| hl-assets Uploader | drop.fzymgc.net |
24h | Two, in order: scripted clients by four named service tokens (non_identity), then browser SSO for fzymgc.email and fuzzymagic.com |
docs_allow admits fzymgc.email, fzymgc.house, fzymgc.dev and fuzzymagic.com. The
uploader’s browser policy admits two of those. Keep them separate. Widening who can read the docs
site must never widen who can upload.
The uploader sets enable_binding_cookie and http_only_cookie_attribute. It is the one browser
surface that accepts multipart/form-data under a session cookie, and the origin trusts the tunnel
rather than validating the Access JWT, so the binding cookie is the only CSRF control in play.
The four service tokens are named one by one in the non_identity policy rather than admitting
every service token in the account. Revoking one client’s credential leaves the others working.
Service-token expiry: two controls, neither redundant
Section titled “Service-token expiry: two controls, neither redundant”Every service token in access.tf carries duration = "8760h". An expired token gets a 302 to
the Access login page, which on the wire looks the same as a token that was never in the policy.
| Control | Where | Lead time | Scope |
|---|---|---|---|
cloudflare_notification_policy.hl_assets_service_token_expiry |
access.tf, emails var.notification_email |
One week. The alert type has no other setting | Every Access service token in the account. The alert type takes no filter |
| The uptime monitor | tf/uptime-kuma/monitors-hl-assets.tf |
Its check interval | The monitor’s own token. The canary sends the token on every check, so an expired token reads as DOWN |
var.notification_email has no default and no committed value. It is the non-sensitive workspace
variable notification_email on main-cluster-cloudflare.
Rotating the uploader’s service tokens
Section titled “Rotating the uploader’s service tokens”The three client credentials live at secret/fzymgc-house/cluster/hl-assets/access-token in six
fields, {ios,cli,curl}_client_{id,secret}, written by the apply that creates the tokens.
client_secret is readable at creation only.
share.fishand the documentedcurlone-liner read the Vault path at run time. Rotation costs them nothing beyond the apply.- The iOS pair is authoritative in 1Password and is pasted into the Shortcut by hand. Update the Shortcut after a rotation.
To rotate, set client_secret_version on the resource and raise it. previous_client_secret_expires_at
sets the overlap during which the old secret still works. Move that timestamp into the past to
revoke a compromised credential at once. Open a pull request, merge, then make sure that the Vault
secret carries the new value:
vault kv metadata get secret/fzymgc-house/cluster/hl-assets/access-token # current_version rose by oneNever download a plan JSON for main-cluster-cloudflare to a tracked path or attach it to a pull
request. The artifact is workspace-scoped and carries every credential in the workspace in
cleartext. Fetch to a temporary directory, read what you need, delete it.
The uptime monitor’s own service token
Section titled “The uptime monitor’s own service token”A fourth token, hl_assets_uptime_monitor, lives at
secret/fzymgc-house/cluster/hl-assets/monitor-token, on a different path on purpose. The path
keeps the terraform-uptime-kuma-admin grant narrow: a scheduled check must not hold every
uploader credential. It needs no expiry alarm of its own, because the notification policy covers
every service token in the account.
Destroying and recreating this token rotates the credential, and the monitor reads DOWN until
main-cluster-uptime-kuma applies again. Re-apply that workspace in the same change.
R2 usage alerting (OPS-02)
Section titled “R2 usage alerting (OPS-02)”Four cloudflare_notification_policy resources in notifications-hl_assets.tf watch R2 operation
volume. They are the cross product of two axes, and both survive:
| Anomaly, is something wrong? | Cost ceiling, is a bill coming? | |
|---|---|---|
| Class A (writes) | 10,000 ops/month | 1,000,000 ops/month |
| Class B (reads) | 200,000 ops/month | 10,000,000 ops/month |
Where the numbers come from:
- Each ceiling sits at the R2 free tier for its class, so the alarm fires no later than the first billable operation.
- The Class B anomaly limit must clear a floor of
43,800 × (1 + replicas)operations a month. Two in-house sources produce Class B operations in a healthy system, each about 43,800 a month at a 60-second cadence: the canary monitor, whose path is left uncached so that it can detect real downtime, and the uploader’s own reachability prober, oneHeadObjectagainst the private bucket perSTATUS_PROBE_INTERVALper replica.billing_usage_alertis account-scoped with no bucket predicate, so both count against the same limit. The rule islimit >= 2 × 43,800 × (1 + replicas). If you scale the uploader Deployment or shorten the probe interval, raise the limit in the same change. - The Class A anomaly limit is two orders of magnitude lower because nothing bounds writes from below. Only the four authenticated ingest surfaces can produce a Class A operation.
- A Class B spike means cache misses, not popularity. The public
/f/prefix is edge-cached for thirty days. Read a spike as key enumeration or as a caching regression.
The product literals are r2_class_a_operations and r2_class_b_operations. The API matcher is
exact and case-sensitive, and product and limit each take exactly one value. A rejected value
fails the whole shared workspace apply, so do not re-spell either literal.
The account also carries dashboard-made alert policies that Terraform does not track. Read them
with GET /accounts/<account_id>/alerting/v3/policies. A spend alarm there does not substitute
for the volume alarms above.
Workers
Section titled “Workers”HCP Terraform Discord Worker
Section titled “HCP Terraform Discord Worker”Transforms HCP Terraform notification webhooks into Discord embeds.
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Code | cloudflare/workers/hcp-terraform-discord/worker.js |
| Terraform | tf/cloudflare/workers.tf |
| Secrets | DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL and HMAC_SECRET, from the two Vault paths above |
When HMAC_SECRET is set, the Worker validates X-TFE-Notification-Signature and rejects an
invalid signature with 401.
Tesla Fleet key Worker
Section titled “Tesla Fleet key Worker”Serves the Tesla Fleet public key of Home Assistant at
https://ha.fzymgc.net/.well-known/appspecific/com.tesla.3p.public-key.pem. Every other path
answers 404. Tesla reads the key when Home Assistant registers the domain, and each vehicle pairs
with it. The Worker runs on the Workers Free plan with no origin, so the key answers while the
cluster and the tunnel are down.
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Code | cloudflare/workers/tesla-fleet-key/worker.js |
| Key | cloudflare/workers/tesla-fleet-key/com.tesla.3p.public-key.pem, read into the TESLA_PUBLIC_KEY binding |
| Terraform | tf/cloudflare/workers.tf |
| Domain | ha.fzymgc.net, a Worker custom domain in the fzymgc.net zone |
| Runbook | docs/operations/home-assistant.md, section Tesla Fleet |
A change to the key file publishes a new Worker version on merge. While the file is absent, the
binding is empty and the key path answers 404. The workspace main-cluster-cloudflare carries the
trigger prefix cloudflare, so a merge that touches only cloudflare/workers/ starts a run. A
merge that reports Run not triggered applied nothing, and an operator starts the run by hand
from the workspace page.
hl-assets.dev Edge Rules and Managed Objects
Section titled “hl-assets.dev Edge Rules and Managed Objects”This section is operational. The reasoning lives in the edge-policy ADR.
The three rulesets
Section titled “The three rulesets”rulesets-hl_assets_dev.tf declares the only cloudflare_ruleset resources in the repository,
one entry point per phase:
| Ruleset phase | Effect |
|---|---|
http_request_cache_settings |
Cache everything under /f/*. Edge TTL 2592000 s, browser TTL 3600 s, 404 TTL 30 s |
http_response_headers_transform |
Five security headers on every response. Content-Disposition inline for the allowlisted extensions under /f/, attachment for everything else under /f/ |
http_request_transform |
Blank the query string under /f/ before the cache phase |
Change them the same way as everything else here: pull request, HCP plan, merge. Never in the dashboard.
A zone holds exactly one entry point per phase, and the pinned provider does not adopt an entry
point that already exists. A second resource for a phase that has one is an apply failure for the
whole shared workspace. Add rules to the rules list of the existing resource. List order is
evaluation order. Before you declare a ruleset for a new phase, read the entry point:
curl -sS -H "Authorization: Bearer $CF_TOKEN" \ "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/zones/<zone_id>/rulesets/phases/<phase>/entrypoint"Error code 10003 means the phase is empty. Declare the resource with no import{} block. A
body that reads request is not authorized with no error code is a permission denial, not an
absence. The recovery import{} shape, for a phase that does return an id, is recorded next to
the resources in rulesets-hl_assets_dev.tf.
Objects in the public bucket that are not user content
Section titled “Objects in the public bucket that are not user content”hl-assets-public holds five permanent objects placed by this project. Four sit under the /f/
user-content prefix. tools/hl-assets-verify places them and re-places one only if its bytes
differ. Deleting one breaks a verification check and leaves stale bytes serving from the edge.
| Key | What it proves |
|---|---|
f/_probe/cacheprobe.heic |
.heic is cached at the edge. It is absent from Cloudflare’s default cacheable-extension list |
f/_probe/cacheprobe.mov |
.mov is cached at the edge, for the same reason |
f/_probe/dispositionprobe.svg |
A non-allowlisted extension downloads rather than renders |
f/_probe/dispositionprobe.html |
The same, for the format with the largest execution surface |
robots.txt |
The crawl policy is served from a bucket object, not from R2’s 404 page |
The probes are permanent because the /f/* cache rule sets a 30-day edge TTL. A fixture placed
and removed on each run would keep serving from the edge for up to a month unless the check also
purged it, and a purge that fails silently leaves stale bytes with nothing noticing. Fixed keys
need no purge.
Takedown window
Section titled “Takedown window”Removing an object from hl-assets-public does not stop it being served at once.
| Tier | TTL | Reachable by an operator? |
|---|---|---|
| Cloudflare edge | 2592000 s (30 days) |
Yes. A zone or prefix purge clears it. This is what the Cache Purge grant exists for |
| Browser | 3600 s (1 hour) |
No. Nothing an operator does reaches a browser that already holds the bytes |
A takedown is delete plus purge, and anyone who fetched the link inside the last hour keeps a
copy until their browser cache expires. The procedure is in
hl-assets Uploader → Taking a link down.
It depends on the Cache Purge grant under API Token Pattern. No Terraform
resource uses that grant, and the procedure does.
Common Operations
Section titled “Common Operations”Bootstrap Token Setup (One-Time)
Section titled “Bootstrap Token Setup (One-Time)”-
In the Cloudflare dashboard, create a custom token with every grant in the table under API Token Pattern.
-
Set the zone resource to “All zones from an account” and pick the account. Do not pick “All Domains”: an account-owned token rejects that wildcard with
Account tag in access policy must match tag in request uri. -
Set an expiry of one year, not never.
-
Write it to Vault:
Terminal window vault kv put secret/fzymgc-house/infrastructure/cloudflare/bootstrap-token token="<token>" -
Merge a change under
tf/cloudflare/so that the workspace plans and applies with the new token. Make sure that the run reads the token: a wrong token fails at plan with a 403.
Apply Order
Section titled “Apply Order”tf/vault -> tf/cloudflare -> tf/uptime-kumatf/vault creates the HMAC secret and the grants. tf/cloudflare deploys the Worker, mints the
workload tokens and writes their Vault paths. tf/uptime-kuma reads the monitor token. The
workspaces carry no run triggers between them, so a change that touches two of them queues two
runs with no ordering guarantee. Land the grant first, alone.
r2-authentik-orphan.tf holds a one-shot removed block that forgets an orphaned bucket from
state. Delete the file after the apply that consumes it succeeds.
Troubleshooting
Section titled “Troubleshooting”DNS Not Resolving
Section titled “DNS Not Resolving”- Read propagation:
dig @1.1.1.1 <name>. - Make sure that the record is in Terraform state and not only in the dashboard.
Token Authentication Errors
Section titled “Token Authentication Errors”403 Forbidden - Authentication error means the token lacks a grant, or the target zone is
outside the token’s scope.
-
Read the token’s grants with the API call under API Token Pattern.
-
If one zone fails while others work, the token was re-scoped to named domains. Set it back to all zones in the account.
-
Make sure that Vault holds the token:
Terminal window vault kv metadata get secret/fzymgc-house/infrastructure/cloudflare/bootstrap-token
Account tag in access policy must match tag in request uri
Section titled “Account tag in access policy must match tag in request uri”The token’s zone policy was set to “All Domains”. An account-owned token needs “All zones from an account”.
Tunnel Not Connecting
Section titled “Tunnel Not Connecting”kubectl -n cloudflared get podskubectl -n cloudflared logs -l app.kubernetes.io/name=cloudflaredvault kv metadata get secret/fzymgc-house/cluster/cloudflared/tunnels/fzymgc-house-mainWorker Deployment Fails
Section titled “Worker Deployment Fails”curl -sS -H "Authorization: Bearer $CF_TOKEN" \ "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/<account_id>/workers/scripts" | jq '.result[].id'See Also
Section titled “See Also”- HCP Terraform Operations: webhook notifications
tf/cloudflare/CLAUDE.md: file layout, import rules and the drift check for the R2 custom domain- Tunnel connector:
argocd/app-configs/cloudflared-main/ - Worker code:
cloudflare/workers/hcp-terraform-discord/