The resolver pair resolves public names through anonymizing relays, and Control D leaves
Date: 2026-10-06
Status: Accepted
Deciders: Sean Brandt
Supersedes: docs/adr/hl-p5ck-accept-control-d-endpoint-level-attribution-not-per-client.md
Context
Section titled “Context”Both Blocky instances on the resolver pair forwarded every public name to Control D over DNS over
TLS. Control D saw each query with the home address, and it did most of the blocking: in the 30
days before 2026-10-05 it refused 423,852 queries of the main instance, against 29,906 by the lists
of Blocky. The ADR hl-p5ck of 2026-07-07 accepted that Control D sees one endpoint for the whole
house.
On 2026-10-05 Sean decided to drop Control D, and that the resolver which replaces it must not see
the home address. The OpenSpec change blocky-takes-control-d-blocklists moved the blocking to
HaGeZi lists in Blocky the same day. HaGeZi Pro++ held 315 of the 318 names that Control D refused
most, which is 99.7% of that volume.
Decision
Section titled “Decision”Each resolver node runs one dnscrypt-proxy 2.1.18, as its own user, under a hardened unit, on
two loopback listeners. Both Blocky instances name 127.0.0.1:5300 as their only upstream. The
node’s own /etc/resolv.conf names 127.0.0.2:53 as its second nameserver, after Blocky. That
second listener replaces the packaged dnscrypt-proxy 2.1.8 that roles/dns-common ran with DoH
to two static stamps, because the two shared a unit name and a configuration path.
The daemon speaks Anonymized DNSCrypt. It encrypts each query for the resolver and sends it to a
relay of another operator. The relay sees the home address and no query. The resolver sees the
query and the address of the relay. Five resolvers are in the set: cs-dc and cs-nyc of
CryptoStorm through dnscry.pt relays, dnscry.pt-ashburn-ipv4 and dnscry.pt-newyork-ipv4
through CryptoStorm relays, and plan9dns-nj through both.
The path fails closed. skip_incompatible drops a resolver that cannot be reached through its
relays. direct_cert_fallback is off. The render refuses an empty server list, a server without a
route, and a Blocky upstream that is not a loopback address. When no route is live, a public name
answers SERVFAIL.
Each query carries a fresh client key (dnscrypt_ephemeral_keys), and the post-quantum mode is
off, because that mode lets a resolver group every query of one client under one pseudonym.
No ODoH route is in the set. dnscrypt-proxy fetches the ODoH configuration of a target from the target itself, so the target learns the home address.
Consequences
Section titled “Consequences”- No resolver outside the house sees the home address with a query. The relays see the address and the time of each query, and nothing else.
- Two operators run every relay the pair uses, CryptoStorm and dnscry.pt. When both fail, every
public name answers
SERVFAILuntil one returns. That is the chosen trade. - The few host names the daemon needs before a route is live, and the list host at a refresh, resolve through plain Quad9. Quad9 sees those names and no client query.
- Threat blocking rests on the HaGeZi TIF list in Blocky. No resolver in the set filters.
- The node’s own fallback goes through the same daemon. A node with Blocky down and every relay down resolves no public name. Before 2026-10-06 the fallback reached Cloudflare and Quad9 directly, and showed the home address to them.
- Two HyperDX alerts read the journal of the daemon: one marks the start of an outage, and one stays in alert while it lasts.
scripts/dns-break-external.shstops and starts the daemon instead of dropping TCP port 853.- The Control D account serves other endpoints until its renewal on 2027-01-08. Sean decides it then.
Alternatives set aside
Section titled “Alternatives set aside”- UniFi content filtering. The gateway is not in the DNS path of a client, and as an upstream it gives one profile for every leg.
- DNS over TLS from Blocky to a public resolver. The smallest change, and the resolver still sees the home address.
- Quad9 through a relay. It answered through one relay of five in the spike of 2026-10-05.
- The ODoH route to Cloudflare. Set aside after the security review of 2026-10-06, for the reason above.
Records
Section titled “Records”The measurements are in openspec/changes/archive/2026-10-05-blocky-takes-control-d-blocklists
and in the OpenSpec change pair-drops-control-d. The runbook is docs/operations/dns.md, section
The anonymizing upstream, dnscrypt-proxy.